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Abstract—Cooperative spectrum sensing, despite its effective-
ness in enabling dynamic spectrum access, suffers from location
privacy threats, merely because Secondary Users (SU s)’ sensing
reports that need to be shared with a fusion center to make
spectrum availability decisions are highly correlated to the users’
locations. It is therefore important that cooperative spectrum
sensing schemes be empowered with privacy preserving capabil-
ities so as to provide SU s with incentives for participating in
the sensing task. In this paper, we propose privacy preserving
protocols that make use of various cryptographic mechanisms to
preserve the location privacy of SU s while performing reliable
and efficient spectrum sensing. We also present cost-performance
tradeoffs. The first consists on using an additional architectural
entity at the benefit of incurring lower computation overhead by
relying only on symmetric cryptography. The second consists on
using an additional secure comparison protocol at the benefit of
incurring lesser architectural cost by not requiring extra entities.
Our schemes can also adapt to the case of a malicious Fusion
Center (FC ) as we discuss in this paper. We also show that not
only are our proposed schemes secure and more efficient than
existing alternatives, but also achieve fault tolerance and are
robust against sporadic network topological changes.
Index Terms—Location privacy, secure cooperative spectrum
sensing, order preserving encryption, cognitive radio networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
Cooperative spectrum sensing is a key component ofcognitive radio networks (CRN s) essential for enabling
dynamic and opportunistic spectrum access [1]–[3]. It consists
of having secondary users (SU s) sense the licensed channels
on a regular basis and collaboratively decide whether a channel
is available prior to using it so as to avoid harming primary
users (PU s). One of the most popular spectrum sensing
techniques is energy detection, thanks to its simplicity and ease
of implementation, which essentially detects the presence of
PU ’s signal by measuring and relying on the energy strength
of the sensed signal, commonly known as the received signal
strength (RSS ) [4].
Broadly speaking, cooperative spectrum sensing techniques
can be classified into two categories: centralized and dis-
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tributed [1]. In centralized techniques, a central entity called
fusion center (FC ) orchestrates the sensing operations as
follows. It selects one channel for sensing and, through a
control channel, requests that each SU perform local sensing
on that channel and send its sensing report (e.g., the observed
RSS value) back to it. It then combines the received sensing
reports, makes a decision about the channel availability, and
diffuses the decision back to the SU s. In distributed sensing
techniques, SU s do not rely on a FC for making channel avail-
ability decisions. They instead exchange sensing information
among one another to come to a unified decision [1].
Despite its usefulness and effectiveness in promoting dy-
namic spectrum access, cooperative spectrum sensing suffers
from serious security and privacy threats. One big threat to
SU s, which we tackle in this work, is location privacy, which
can easily be compromised due to the wireless nature of the
signals communicated by SU s during the cooperative sensing
process. In fact, it has been shown that RSS values of SU s are
highly correlated to their physical locations [5], thus making it
easy to compromise the location privacy of SU s when sending
out their sensing reports. The fine-grained location, when
combined with other publicly available information, could
easily be exploited to infer private information about users [6].
Examples of such private information are shopping patterns,
user preferences, and user beliefs, just to name a few [6].
With such privacy threats and concerns, SU s may refuse to
participate in the cooperative sensing tasks. It is therefore
imperative that cooperative sensing schemes be enabled with
privacy preserving capabilities that protect the location privacy
of SU s, thereby encouraging them to participate in such a key
CRN function, the spectrum sensing.
In this paper, we propose two efficient privacy-preserving
schemes with several variants for cooperative spectrum sens-
ing. These schemes exploit various cryptographic mechanisms
to preserve the location privacy of SU s while performing the
cooperative sensing task reliably and efficiently.
In addition, we study the cost-performance tradeoffs of the
proposed schemes, and show that higher privacy and better
performance can be achieved, but at the cost of deploying
an additional architectural entity in the system. We show that
our proposed schemes are secure and more efficient than
their existing counterparts, and are robust against sporadic
topological changes and network dynamism.
A. Related Work
Security and privacy in CRN s have gained some attention
recently. Adem et al. [7] addressed jamming attacks in CRN s.
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2Yan et al. [8] discussed security issues in fully distributed co-
operative sensing. Qin et al. [9] proposed a privacy-preserving
protocol for CRN transactions using a commitment scheme
and zero-knowledge proof. Wang et al. [10] proposed a privacy
preserving framework for collaborative spectrum sensing in the
context of multiple service providers.
Location privacy, though well studied in the context of
location-based services (LBS) [11], [12], has received little
attention in the context of CRN s [5], [13], [14]. Some
works focused on location privacy but not in the context of
cooperative spectrum sensing (e.g., database-driven spectrum
sensing [13], [15] and dynamic spectrum auction [14]) and are
skipped since they are not within this paper’s scope.
In the context of cooperative spectrum sensing, Shuai et
al. [5] showed that SU s’ locations can easily be inferred
from their RSS reports, and called this the SRLP (single
report location privacy) attack. They also identified the DLP
(differential location privacy) attack, where a malicious entity
can estimate the RSS (and hence the location) of a leav-
ing/joining user from the variations in the final aggregated
RSS measurements before and after user’s joining/leaving of
the network. They finally proposed PPSS to address these two
attacks. Despite its merits, PPSS has several limitations: (i)
It needs to collect all the sensing reports in order to decode
the aggregated result. This is not fault tolerant, since some
reports may be missing due, for example, to the unreliable
nature of wireless channels. (ii) It cannot handle dynamism if
multiple users join or leave the network simultaneously. (iii)
The pairwise secret sharing requirement incurs extra commu-
nication overhead and delay. (iv) The underlying encryption
scheme requires solving the Discrete Logarithm Problem,
which is possible only for very small plaintext space and can
be extremely costly. Chen et al. [16] proposed PDAFT , a
fault-tolerant and privacy-preserving data aggregation scheme
for smart grid communications. PDAFT , though proposed
in the context of smart grids, is suitable for cooperative
sensing schemes. But unlike PPSS , PDAFT relies on an
additional semi-trusted entity, called gateway, and like other
aggregation based methods, is prone to the DLP attack. In our
previous work [17] we proposed an efficient scheme called
LPOS to overcome the limitations that existent approaches
suffer from. LPOS combines order preserving encryption and
yao’s millionaire protocol to provide a high location privacy
to the users while enabling an efficient sensing performance.
B. Our Contribution
In this paper, we propose two location privacy-preserving
schemes for cooperative spectrum sensing that achieve:
• Location privacy of secondary users while performing the
cooperative spectrum sensing effectively and reliably.
• Fault tolerance and robustness against network dynamism
(e.g., multiple SU s join/leave the network) and failures
(e.g., missed sensing reports).
• Reliability and resiliency against malicious users via an
efficient reputation mechanism.
• Accurate spectrum availability decisions via half-voting
rules while incurring minimum communication and com-
putation overhead.
Compared to our preliminary works [18] and [17], this paper
provides a more efficient version of LPOS [17], referred
to as LP-2PSS in this paper, that is also robust against
malicious users and adapted to a stronger threat model for FC .
Besides, this paper provides another variant of LP-3PSS [18]
that improves the crytpographic end-to-end delay. Finally,
this paper provides an improved security analysis and more
comprehensive performance analysis.
The reason why we present two variants is to give more
options to system designers to decide which topology and
which approach is more suitable to their specific requirements.
There are tradeoffs between the two options. While LP-
2PSS provides location privacy guarantees without needing
to introduce an extra architectural entity, it requires relatively
high computational overhead due to the use of the Yao’s
millionaires’ protocol. On the other hand, LP-3PSS provides
stronger privacy guarantees (as the private inputs are shared
among 3 non-colluding entities) and reduces the computational
overhead substantially when compared to LP-2PSS, but at the
cost of introducing an extra architectural entity.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
Section II provides our system and security threat models.
Section III presents our preliminary concepts and definitions.
Section IV and V provide an extensive explanation of the
proposed schemes. Section VI gives the security analysis
of these schemes. Section VII presents their performance
analysis and a comparison with existent approaches. Finally,
Section VIII concludes this work.
II. SYSTEM AND SECURITY THREAT MODELS
A. System Model
We consider a cooperative spectrum sensing architecture
that consists of a FC and a set of SU s.
Each SU is assumed to be capable of measuring RSS on
any channel by means of an energy detection method [4]. In
this cooperative sensing architecture, the FC combines the
sensing observations collected from the SU s, decides about
the spectrum availability, and broadcasts the decision back
to the SU s through a control channel. This could typically
be done via either hard or soft decision rules. The most
common soft decision rule is aggregation, where FC collects
the RSS values from the SU s and compares their average to a
predefined threshold, τ , to decide on the channel availability.
In hard decision rules, e.g. voting, FC combines votes
instead of RSS values. Here, each SU compares its RSS value
with τ , makes a local decision (available or not), and then
sends to the FC its one-bit local decision/vote instead of
sending its RSS value. FC applies then a voting rule on
the collected votes to make a channel availability decision.
However, for security reasons to be discussed shortly, it may
not be desirable to share τ with SU s. In this case, FC can
instead collect the RSS values from the SU s, make a vote
for each SU separately, and then combine all votes to decide
about the availability of the channel.
In this work, we opted for the voting-based decision rule,
with τ is not to be shared with the SU s, over the aggregation-
based rule. Two reasons for why choosing voting over aggre-
gation: One, aggregation methods are more prone to sensing
3errors; for example, receiving some erroneous measurements
that are far off from the average of the RSS values can skew
the computed RSS average, thus leading to wrong decision.
Two, voting does not expose users to the DLP attack [5]
(which was identified earlier in Section I-A). We chose not to
share τ with the SU s because doing so limits the action scope
of malicious users that may want to report falsified RSS values
for malicious and/or selfish purposes.
In this paper, in addition to this 2-party (i.e., FC and SU s)
cooperative sensing architecture that we just described above,
we investigate a 3-party cooperative sensing architecture,
where a third entity, called gateway (GW ), is incorporated
along with the FC and SU s to cooperate with them in
performing the sensing task. As we show later, this gateway
allows to achieve higher privacy and lesser computational
overhead, but of course at its cost.
B. Security Threat Models and Objectives
We make the following security assumptions:
Security Assumptions 1. (i) FC may modify the value of
τ in different sensing periods to extract information about
the RSS values of SU s; (ii) GW executes the protocol
honestly but shows interest in learning information about the
other parties; (iii) FC does not collude with SU s; and (iv)
GW does not collude with SU s or FC .
We aim to achieve the following security objectives:
Security Objectives 1. (i) Keep RSS value of each SU con-
fidential; and (ii) Keep τ confidential. This should hold during
all sensing periods and for any network membership change.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Half-Voting Availability Decision Rule
Our proposed schemes use the half-voting decision rule,
shown to be optimal in [19], and for completeness, we here
highlight its main idea. Details can be found in [19].
Let h0 and h1 be the spectrum sensing hypothesis that
PU is absent and present, respectively. Let Pf , Pd and Pm
denote the probabilities of false alarm, detection, and missed
detection, respectively, of one SU ; i.e., Pf = Pr(RSS > τ |
h0), Pd = Pr(RSS > τ | h1), and Pm = 1− Pd.
FC collects the 1-bit decision D i from each SU i and fuses
them together according to the following fusion rule [19]:
dec =

H1,
n∑
i=1
D i ≥ λ
H0,
n∑
i=1
D i < λ
(1)
FC infers that PU is present, i.e. H1, when at least λ SU s
are inferring h1. Otherwise, FC decides that PU is absent,
i.e. H0. Note that the OR fusion rule, in which FC decides
H1 if at least one of the decisions from the SU s is h1,
corresponds to the case where λ = 1. The AND fusion rule,
in which FC decides H1 if and only if all decisions from
the SU s are h1, corresponds to the case where λ = n . The
cooperative spectrum sensing false alarm probability, Qf , and
missed detection probability, Qm, are: Qf = Pr(H1 | h0)
and Qm = Pr(H0 | h1).
Letting n be the number of SU s, the optimal value of λ that
minimizes Qf + Qm is λopt = min(n, dn/(1 + α)e), where
α = ln(
Pf
1−Pm )/ ln(
Pm
1−Pf ) and d·e denotes the ceiling function.
The value of λopt comes from the half-voting rule presented
in [19]. We use it since it was proven in [19] to provide the
best sensing performance in voting based cooperative sensing.
For simplicity, λopt is denoted as λ throughout this paper.
B. Reputation Mechanism
To make the voting rule more reliable, we incorporate a
reputation mechanism that allows FC to progressively elim-
inate faulty and malicious SU s. It does so by updating and
maintaining a reputation score for each SU that reflects its
level of reliability. Our proposed schemes incorporate the Beta
Reputation mechanism [20]. For completeness, we highlight
its key features next; more details can be found in [20] from
which all computations in this subsection are based.
At the end of each sensing period t, FC obtains a decision
vector, b(t) = [b1(t), b2(t), . . . , bn(t)]T with bi(t) ∈ {0, 1},
where bi(t) = 0 (resp. bi(t) = 1) means that the spectrum is
reported to be free (resp. busy) by user SU i. FC then makes
a global decision using the fusion rule f as follows:
dec(t) = f(w(t), b(t)) =
1 if
n∑
i=1
wi(t)bi(t) ≥ λ
0 otherwise
(2)
where w(t) = [w1(t), w2(t) . . . , wn(t)]T is the weight vector
calculated by FC based on the credibility score of each user, as
will be shown shortly, and λ is the voting threshold determined
by the Half-voting rule [19], as presented in Section III-A.
For each SU i, FC maintains positive and negative rating
coefficients, %i(t) and ηi(t), that are updated every sensing
period t as: %i(t) = %i(t− 1) + ν1(t) and ηi(t) = ηi(t− 1) +
ν2(t), where ν1(t) and ν2(t) are calculated as
ν1(t) =
{
1 bi(t) = dec(t)
0 otherwise ν2(t) =
{
1 bi(t) 6= dec(t)
0 otherwise
Here, %i(t) (resp. ηi(t)) reflects the number of times SU i’s
observation, bi(t), agrees (resp. disagrees) with the FC ’s
global decision, dec(t).
FC computes then SU i’s credibility score, ϕi(t), and con-
tribution weight, wi(t), at sensing period t as suggested in [20]:
ϕi(t)=
%i(t) + 1
%i(t)+ηi(t)+2
(3)
wi(t)=ϕi(t)/
n∑
j=1
ϕj(t) (4)
C. Cryptographic Building Blocks
Our schemes use a few known cryptographic building
blocks, which we define next before using them in the next
sections when describing our schemes so as to ease the
presentation.
4Definition 1. Order Preserving Encryption (OPE): is a
deterministic symmetric encryption scheme whose encryption
preserves the numerical ordering of the plaintexts, i.e. for
any two messages m1 and m2 s.t. m1 ≤ m2, we have
c1 ← OPE .EK(m1) ≤ c2 ← OPE .EK(m2) [21], with
c← OPE .EK(m) is order preserving encryption of a message
m ∈ {0, 1}d under key K, where d is the block size of OPE .
Definition 2. Yao’s Millionaires’ (YM ) Protocol [22]: is a
Secure Comparison protocol that enables two parties to exe-
cute ”the greater-than” function, GT (x, y) = [x > y], without
disclosing any other information apart from the outcome.
Definition 3. Tree-based Group Elliptic Curve Diffie-
Hellman (TGECDH ) [23]: is a dynamic and contributory
group key establishment protocol that permits multiple users
to collaboratively establish and update a group key K.
Definition 4. Group Key independence: given a subset of
previous keys, an attacker cannot know any other group key.
Definition 5. Elliptic Curve Discrete Logarithm Problem
(ECDLP) : given an elliptic curve E over GF (q) and points
(P,Z) ∈ E, find an integer x, if any exists, s.t. Z = xP .
Definition 6. Digital Signature: A digital signature scheme
SGN is used to validate the authenticity and integrity of a
message m. It contains three components defined as follows:
• Key generation algorithm (Kg): returns a private/public
key pair given a security parameter 1κ, (SKDS ,PKDS ) ←
SGN .Kg(1κ).
• Signing algorithm (Sign): takes as input a message m
and the secret key SKDS and returns a signature σ, σ ←
SGN .Sign(SKDS ,m).
• Verification algorithm (Ver): takes as input the public
key PKDS , m and σ. It returns 1 if valid and 0 if invalid,
{0, 1} ← SGN .Ver(PKDS ,m, σ).
Note that communications are made over a secure (authen-
ticated) channel maintained with a symmetric key (e.g., via
SSL/TLS) to ensure confidentiality and authentication. For the
sake of brevity, we will only write encryptions but not the
authentication tags (e.g., Message Authentication Codes [24])
for the rest of the paper.
In the following we present the two schemes that we
propose in this paper. For convenience and before getting into
the details of the proposed approaches, we have summarized
the different notations that we use in the remaining parts of
this paper in Table I.
IV. LP-2PSS
We now present our first proposed scheme, which is a
voting-based approach designed for the 2-party cooperative
spectrum sensing network, consisting of one FC and a set of
SU s. Throughout, we refer to this scheme by LP-2PSS (lo-
cation privacy for 2-party spectrum sensing architecture). LP-
2PSS achieves the aforementioned security objectives via an
innovative integration of the OPE , TGECDH and YM proto-
cols. Voting-based spectrum sensing offers several advantages
over its aggregation-based counterparts as discussed in Section
TABLE I: Notations
SU Secondary user
FC Fusion center
GW Gateway
RSS Received signal strength
γ = |RSS | = |τ |
n Average number of SU s per sensing period
G Set of all SU s in the system
λ Optimal voting threshold
τ Energy sensing threshold
q Large prime number for ECElG
E Elliptic curve over a finite field GF (q)
bi Outcome of YM .ECElG between τ and RSSi
dec Final decision made by FC
K Group key established by SU s
σ Digital signature
w Vector of weights assigned to SU s
T Table of ECElG ciphertexts exchanged in YM .ECElG
PKDS Public key used for the digital signature
SKDS Secret key used for the digital signature
kFC ,i Secret key established between FC & SU i
kGW ,i Secret key established between GW & SU i
kFC ,GW Secret key established between FC & GW
(E,D) ECElG encryption-decryption for YM .ECElG
(E,D) IND-CPA secure block cipher encryption-decryption
OPE .E OPE encryption
ci = OPE .EK(RSSi)
θi = EkFC ,GW (OPE .EkFC ,i(τ))
ςi = EkGW ,i(OPE .EkFC ,i(RSSi))
ζ = EkFC ,GW ({bi}ni=1)
chni Secure authenticated channel between FC and SU i
L1 History list including all values learned by {SU i}ni=1L2 History list including all values learned by FC
L3 History list including all values learned by GW
β(t) Average number of SU s joining the CRN at t
µ Average of the membership change process
III, but requires comparing FC ’s threshold τ and SU s’ RSS s,
thereby forcing at least one of the parties to expose its
information to the other. One solution is to use a secure
comparison protocol, such as YM , between FC and each
SU , which permits FC to learn the total number of SU s
above/below τ but nothing else. However, secure comparison
protocols involve several costly public key crypto operations
(e.g., modular exponentiation), and therefore O(n) invoca-
tions of such a protocol per sensing period, thus incurring
prohibitive computational and communication overhead.
• Intuition: The key observation that led us to overcome
this challenge is the following: If we enable FC to learn
the relative order of RSS values but nothing else, then the
number of YM invocations can be reduced drastically. That
is, the knowledge of relative order permits FC to execute
YM protocol at worst-case O(log(n)) by utilizing a binary-
search type approach, as opposed to running YM with each
user in total O(n) overhead. This is where OPE comes into
play. The crux of our idea is to make users OPE encrypt
their RSS values under a group key K, which is derived
via TGECDH at the beginning of the protocol. This allows
FC to learn the relative order of encrypted RSS values but
nothing else (and users do not learn each others’ RSS values,
as they are sent to FC over a pairwise secure channel).
FC then uses this knowledge to run YM protocol by utilizing
a binary-search strategy, which enables it to identify the total
number of users above/below τ and then compares it to λ. As
5FC may try to maliciously modify the value of τ as stated in
Security Assumption 1, this makes it easier for it to infer the
RSS values of SU s, thus their location. We rely on digital
signatures to overcome this limitation. A digital signature is
used by SU s to verify the integrity of the information that was
sent by FC during the execution of YM protocol and signed
by the service operator as we explain in more details next.
This strategy makes LP-2PSS achieve SU s’ location privacy
with efficient spectrum sensing, fault-tolerance and network
dynamism simultaneously.
Before we describe our protocol in more details, we first
highlight how we improve the YM protocol proposed in [25]
as shown next.
A. Our Improved YM .ECElG Scheme
To achieve high efficiency, we improve the YM protocol
in [25], in which only the initiator of the protocol learns
the outcome, and call this improved scheme YM .ECElG .
YM .ECElG , described next, is used by our proposed LP-
2PSS to perform secure comparisons. Our secure comparison
scheme improves YM protocol proposed in [25] in two
aspects: (i) We adapt it to work with additive homomorphic
encryption (specifically ECElG) to enable compact compari-
son operations in Elliptic Curves (EC) domain. (ii) The final
stage of YM .ECElG requires solving ECDLP (Definition
5), which is only possible with small plaintext domains, and
this is the case for our 8-bit encoded RSS values required by
IEEE 802.22 standard [26]. However, despite small plaintext
domain, solving ECDLP with brute-force is still costly. We
improve this step by adapting Pollard-Lambda method [27] to
solve the ECDLP for the reverse map, which offers decryption
efficiency and compactness. The Pollard-Lambda method is
designed to solve the ECDLP for points that are known to
lie in a small interval, which is the case for RSS values [27].
Below, we outline our optimized YM .ECElG .
• Notation: Let γ = |RSS | = |τ | denote the size in bits of
the RSS value of a SU and τ of FC to be privately compared.
Also, let n denote the average number of SU s per sensing
period, q be a large prime number, E an elliptic curve over a
finite field GF (q), Z a point on the curve with prime order m.
(sk , pk) is a private/public key pair of Elliptic Curve ElGamal
(ECElG) encryption [28], generated under (E , q, Z,m). Let
pi = (γ,E , q, Z,m, 〈sk , pk〉) be YM .ECElG parameters
generated by FC which is the initiator of the protocol.
YM .ECElG returns b ← YM .ElGamal(τ ,RSS , pi), where
b = 0 if τ < RSS and b = 1 otherwise. Only FC learns
b but (FC ,SU ) learn nothing else. For simplicity during the
description of YM .ECElG , we denote τ as x and RSS as y.
YM .ECElG , as in YM , is based on the fact that x
is greater than y iff S1x and S
0
y have a common ele-
ment where S1x and S
0
y are the 1-encoding of x and the
0-encoding of y respectively. The 0-encoding of a binary
string s = sγsγ−1 . . . s1 ∈ {0, 1}γ is given by S0s =
{sγsγ−1 . . . si+11|si = 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ γ} and the 1-encoding
of s is given by S1s = {sγsγ−1 . . . si|si = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ γ}.
For example, if we have a string s = 101101, then S0s =
{11, 10111} and S1s = {1, 101, 1011, 101101}. If we want to
compare two values x = 46 = 101110 and y = 45 = 101101,
we need first to construct S1x = {1, 101, 1011, 10111} and
S0y = {11, 10111}. Since S1x ∩ S0y 6= ∅, then x > y.
FC with a private input x = xγxγ−1 . . . x1 generates pi for
encryption and decryption (E,D) then prepares a 2× γ-table
T [i, j], i ∈ 0, 1, 1 ≤ j ≤ γ such that T [xi, i] = E(1) and
T [x¯i, i] = E(ri) for a random ri in the subgroup Gq and fi-
nally sends T to SU . SU with private input y = yγyγ−1 . . . y1
computes ct for each t = tltγ−1 . . . ti ∈ S0y as follows
ct = T [tγ , γ]⊕ T [tγ−1, γ − 1] . . .⊕ T [ti, i] (5)
with ⊕ denotes Elliptic Curve point addition operations (⊕
replaces × in the original YM scheme). SU then prepares
l = γ−|S0y | random encryptions zj = (aj , bj) ∈ G2q, 1 ≤ j ≤
l and permutes ct’s and zj’s to obtain cˆ1, · · · , cˆγ which are
sent back to FC that decrypts D(cˆi) = mi, 1 ≤ j ≤ γ via
Pollard-Lambda algorithm [27] and decides x > y iff some
mi = 0 (mi = 1 in the original YM ). The different steps of
this protocol are summarized in Figure 1.
Fig. 1: YM .ECElG protocol
B. LP-2PSS Descitpion
Next we describe our proposed scheme LP-2PSS whose
main steps are outlined in Algorithm 1.
• Initialization: The service operator sets up the value of
energy threshold τ . FC sets up ECElG crypto parameters,
voting threshold and users reputation weights values. Initially,
all the users are considered credible so the weight vector w
is constituted of ones. FC , then, constructs the table T used
in YM protocol as described in Section IV-A with τ as input
using the FC ’s ECElG public key pk . Notice here that since
the same τ is always used during different sensing periods, the
table T can be precomputed during the Initialization phase.
This considerably reduces this protocol’s computational over-
head. Then the service operator that manages the network signs
T using a digital signature scheme with secret key SKDS .
This digital signature is used to make sure that FC does not
maliciously modify the value of τ to learn RSS values of
users and thus infer their locations. The service operator then
shares the public key PKDS with SU s to use it for verifying
the integrity of T and thus of τ . SU s establish a group
key K via TGECDH , with which they OPE encrypt their
RSS values during the private sensing. FC also establishes a
secure channel chni with each user SU i.
• Private Sensing: Each SU i OPE encrypts its RSS i
with group key K and sends ciphertext ci to FC over chni.
6Algorithm 1 LP-2PSS Algorithm
Initialization: Executed only once.
1: Service operator sets τ .
2: FC generates pi, sets λ and w ← 1.
3: FC pre-computes T using pk .
4: Service operator computes σ ← SGN .Sign(SKDS , T ).
5: Service operator shares PKDS with SU s.
6: G = {SU i}ni=1 establish K via TGECDH protocol.
7: FC establishes chni with each SU i for i = 1, . . . ,n .
Private Sensing: Executed every sensing period tw
8: SU i computes ci ← OPE .EK(RSS i) for i = 1, . . . ,n .
9: SU i sends ci to FC over chni for i = 1, . . . ,n .
10: FC sorts encrypted RSS values as cmin ≤ . . . ≤ cmax.
11: FC runs bidmax ← YM .ECElG (RSSmax, τ , pi) with
SU idmax having cmax.
12: SU idmax verifies T using σ.
13: if SGN .Ver(PKDS , T, σ) = 0 then
14: SU idmax leaves the sensing
15: Go to Step 17.
16: if bidmax = 0 then dec ← Channel free, {bi}ni=1 ← 0.
17: else FC runs bidmin ← YM .ECElG(RSSmin, τ , pi) with
SU idmin having cmin.
18: SU idmin verifies T using σ.
19: if SGN .Ver(PKDS , T, σ) = 0 then
20: SU idmin leaves the sensing
21: Go to Step 27.
22: if bidmin = 1 then dec ← Channel busy, {bi}ni=1 ← 1.
23: else
24: repeat
25: FC computes I ← BinarySearch(G)
26: FC runs bI ← YM .ECElG (RSS I , τ , pi) with
SU I having cI .
27: SU I verifies T using σ.
28: if SGN .Ver(PKDS , T, σ) = 0 then
29: SU I leaves the sensing
30: until RSS I−1 ≤ τ ≤ RSS I
31: FC assigns bi ← 0 for i = 1, . . . , I−1 and bj ← 1
for j = I, . . . ,n
32: FC computes v ←
n∑
i=1
wi × bi
33: if v ≥ λ then dec ← Channel busy
34: else dec ← Channel free
35: FC updates {ϕi}ni=1 and {wi}ni=1 as in Eqs. (3) & (4)
return dec
Update after G Membership Changes or Breakdown:
36: if SU (s) join/leave G or breakdown in tw then
37: New group G′ form new K ′ using TGECDH .
38: FC updates λ and pi as λ’ and pi’, respectively, if
required.
39: Execute the private sensing with (K ′, λ′, pi′).
FC then sorts ciphertexts as cmin ≤ . . . ≤ cmax (as all RSS is
are OPE encrypted under the same K) without learning cor-
responding RSS values, and the secure channel chni protects
the communication of SU i from other users as well as from
outside attackers. FC then initiates YM .ECElG first with the
SU idmax that has the highest RSS value RSSmax. If it is
smaller than energy sensing threshold τ , then the channel is
free. Otherwise, FC initiates YM .ECElG with the user that
has RSSmin. If it is greater than τ , then the channel is busy.
Otherwise, to make the final decision based on the optimal
sensing threshold λ, FC runs YM .ECElG according to the
binary-search strategy which guarantees the decision at the
worst O(log(n)) invocations. Note that before participating in
YM .ECElG , each SU first verifies the integrity of T using the
digital signature σ that was provided by the service operator
as indicated in Steps 12, 18 & 27. A SU that detects a change
in the value of T refuses to participate in the sensing to
prevent FC from learning any sensitive information regarding
its location. In that case the system stops and the malicious
intents of FC are detected.
In Steps 16, 22 & 31 of Algorithm 1, FC constructs the
vector of local decisions of SU s after running the private
comparisons between τ and RSS values. Based on the de-
cision vector b and the weights vector w that was computed
previously, FC computes v in Step 32 using Equation 2 to
finally make the final decision dec using voting threshold λ.
FC then computes the credibility score and the weights that
will be given to all users in the next sensing period. If SU i
has a decision bi 6= dec, its assigned weight decreases. But
if a SU makes the same decision as FC , it is assigned the
highest weight. The main steps of the private sensing phase
are summarized in Figure 2.
Fig. 2: LP-2PSS’s Private Sensing phase
• Update after G Membership Changes or Breakdown: At
the beginning of tw, if membership status of G changes, a new
group key is formed via TGECDH , and then FC updates
λ. If some SU s breakdown and fail to sense or send their
7measurements, λ also must be updated. In new sensing period,
Algorithm 1 is executed with new parameters and group key.
Choice of digital signature
Choosing the right digital signature scheme depends on the
network and users constraints. In the following we briefly
discuss some of the schemes that could be applied in LP-2PSS.
One scheme that could be used is RSA [29] which is one of
the first and most popular digital signature schemes. RSA has
a very large signature but offers a fast signature verification.
However, newer schemes outperform it in terms of signature
and key size and/or computational efficiency.
Another scheme could be ECDSA [30] which is an elliptic
curve analogue of the DSA [31] digital signature scheme. It
provides more compact signatures than its counterparts thanks
to the use of Elliptic Curve crypto. It has a moderate speed,
though, in terms of verification and encryption compared to
RSA. It is more suitable for situations where the communica-
tion overhead is the main concern.
One-time signatures, e.g. HORS [32] and its variants [33],
[34], are digital signatures that are based on one-way functions
without a trapdoor which makes them much faster than com-
monly used digital signatures, like RSA. The main drawbacks
of this kind of digital signatures are their large size and the
complexity of their ”one-timed-ness” which requires a new call
to the key generation algorithm for each use. In our context,
we should not worry about the latter since we sign T only
once so we don’t have to regenerate the keys. In that case,
one-time signatures may be the best option when computation
speed at SU s is the main concern.
NTRU [35] signature could also be applied here. It provides
a tradeoff between signature size and computational efficiency.
Indeed it has a moderate signature size that is larger than the
one of ECDSA but it is faster than both ECDSA and RSA in
key generation, signing and verification.
V. LP-3PSS
We now present an alternative scheme that we call LP-
3PSS (location privacy for 3-party spectrum sensing archi-
tecture), which offers higher privacy and significantly better
performance than that of LP-2PSS, but at the cost of deploying
an additional entity in the network, referred to as Gateway
(GW ) (thus ”3P” refers to the 3 parties: SU s, FC , and GW ).
GW enables a higher privacy by preventing FC from even
learning the order of encrypted RSS values of SU s (as in
LP-2PSS). GW also learns nothing but secure comparison
outcome of a RSS values and τ , as in YM but only using
OPE . Thus, no entity learns any information on RSS or τ be-
yond a pairwise secure comparison, which is the minimum
information required for a voting-based decision.
• Intuition: The main idea behind LP-3PSS is simple yet
very powerful: We enable GW to privately compare n dis-
tinct OPE encryptions of τ and RSS values, which were
computed under n pairwise keys established between FC and
SU s. These OPE encrypted pairs permit GW to learn the
comparison outcomes without deducing any other information.
GW then sends these comparison results to FC to make
the final decision. FC learns no information on RSS values
and SU s cannot obtain the value of τ , which complies with
our Security Objectives 1. Note that LP-3PSS relies only
on symmetric cryptography to guarantee the location privacy
of SU s. Hence, it is the most computationally efficient and
compact scheme among all alternatives but with an additional
entity in the system. LP-3PSS is described in Algorithm 2 and
outlined below.
Algorithm 2 LP-3PSS Algorithm
Initialization: Executed only once.
1: Service operator sets τ .
2: FC sets λ and w ← 1.
3: FC establishes kFC ,i with SU i, i = 1, . . . ,n .
4: GW establishes kGW ,i with SU i, i = 1, . . . ,n .
5: FC establishes kFC ,GW with GW .
6: FC computes θi ← EkFC ,GW (OPE .EkFC ,i(τ)), i =
1, . . . ,n and sends {θi}ni=1 to GW .
Private Sensing: Executed every sensing period tw
7: SU i computes ςi ← EkGW ,i(OPE .EkFC ,i(RSS i)), i =
1, . . . ,n and sends {ςi}ni=1 to GW .
8: GW obtains OPE .EkFC ,i(τ) ← DkFC ,GW (θi) and
OPE .EkFC ,i(RSS i)← DkGW ,i(ςi), i = 1, . . . ,n .
9: for i = 1, . . . ,n do
10: if OPE .EkFC ,i(RSS i) < OPE .EkFC ,i(τ) then bi ← 0
11: else bi ← 1
12: GW computes ζ ← EkFC ,GW ({bi}ni=1) and sends ζ to FC .
13: FC decrypts ζ and computes v ←
n∑
i=1
wi × bi
14: if v ≥ λ then dec ← Channel busy
15: else dec ← Channel free
16: FC updates {ϕi}ni=1 and {wi}ni=1 as in Eqs. (3) & (4)
return dec
Update after G Membership Changes or Breakdown:
17: if SU j joins CRN then
18: SU j establishes kFC ,j with FC and kGW ,j with GW .
19: if SU s join/leave/breakdown then
20: FC updates λ as λ’.
21: Execute the private sensing with λ’.
• Initialization: Service operator and FC set up spec-
trum sensing and crypto parameters. Let (E ,D) be IND-CPA
secure [24] block cipher (e.g. AES ) encryption/decryption
operations. FC establishes a secret key with each SU and
GW . GW establishes a secret key with each SU . FC encrypts
τ with OPE using kFC ,i, i = 1 . . .n . FC then encrypts
OPE ciphertexts with E using kFC ,GW and sends these θis
to GW , i = 1 . . .n . Since these encryptions are done offline
at the beginning of the protocol, they do not impact the online
private sensing phase. FC may also pre-compute a few extra
encrypted values in the case of new users joining the sensing.
• Private Sensing: Each SU i encrypts RSS i with OPE us-
ing kFC ,i, which was used by FC to OPE encrypt τ value.
SU i then encrypts this ciphertext with E using key kGW ,i,
and sends the final ciphertext ςi to GW . GW decrypts 2n
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which yields OPE encrypted values. GW then compares each
OPE encryption of RSS with its corresponding OPE en-
cryption of τ . Since both were encrypted with the same key,
GW can compare them and conclude which one is greater
as in Step 10. GW stores the outcome of each comparison
in a binary vector b , encrpyts and sends it to FC . Finally,
FC compares the summation of votes v to the optimal
voting threshold λ to make the final decision about spectrum
availability and updates the reputation scores of the users.
• Update after G Membership Changes or Breakdown: Each
new user joining the sensing just establishes a pairwise secret
key with FC and GW . This has no impact on existing users.
If some users leave the network, FC and GW remove their
secret keys, which also has no impact on existing users. In
both cases, and also in the case of a breakdown or failure,
λ must be updated accordingly.
Fig. 3: LP-3PSS protocol, θi ← EkFC ,GW (OPE .EkFC ,i(τ)),
ςi ← EkGW ,i(OPE .EkFC ,i(RSS i)) and ζ ← EkFC ,GW ({bi}ni=1)
Remark 1. A malicious FC in LP-3PSS following Security
Assumption 1 may want to maliciously modify the value of
τ . But since GW is the one that performs the comparison
between RSS values and τ , changing τ maliciously has
almost no benefit to FC as it does not have access to
individual comparison outcomes. This makes LP-3PSS robust
against this malicious FC .
It is worth iterating that the GW only needs to perform
simple comparison operations between the RSS values of the
SU s and the energy sensing threshold τ of the FC as we
explained earlier. Thus, such an entity does not interfere with
the spectrum sensing process in the CRN . Moreover, it does
not need to be provided with large computational resources
as these comparisons are very simple and fast to perform. It
could be a standalone entity, one of the SU s that is dedicated
to perform the tasks of the GW or even a secure hardware
that is deployed inside the FC itself as we discuss next. This
gives multiple options to system designers. If FCC’s regulation
allows introducing an additional entity to the CRN , then
GW could be deployed without any concern. If not, system
designers could consider introducing a secure hardware within
FC or dedicating one of the SU s to perform the tasks of GW .
LP-3PSS with Secure Hardware
LP-3PSS could also be implemented in a slightly different
way by relying on a secure hardware deployed within the
FC itself instead of using a dedicated gateway. All the
computation that is performed by GW could be relayed to
this hardware. This secure hardware, which is referred to as
secure co-processor (SCPU ) or as trusted platform module
(TPM) in the literature, is physically shielded from penetration,
and the I/O interface to the module is the only way to access
the internal state of the module [36]. An SCPU that meets
the FIPS 140-2 level 4 [37] physical security requirements
guarantees that FC cannot tamper with its computation. Any
attempt to tamper with this SCPU from FC that results
somehow in penetrating the shield, leads to the automatic
erasure of sensitive memory areas containing critical secrets.
The SCPU may provide several benefits to the network.
First, there is no need anymore of adding a new standalone
entity managed by a third party to the network as was
the case with GW . Also, despite its high cost, having an
SCPU deployed within FC itself may reduce the communi-
cation latency that is incurred by having a gateway that needs
to communicate with FC and with every user in the network.
In terms of performance, it was proven in [38] that at
a large scale the computation inside an SCPU is orders
of magnitude cheaper than equivalent cryptography that is
performed on an unsecured server hardware, despite the overall
greater acquisition cost of secure hardware.
All of this makes using an SCPU a good alternative to using
a dedicated gateway in the network thanks to its performance
and the security guarantees that it provides.
VI. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We first describe the underlying security primitives, on
which our schemes rely, and then precisely quantify the infor-
mation leakage of our schemes, which we prove to achieve our
Security Objectives 1. At the end of this section, we discuss
the security of the modified versions of our schemes.
Fact 1. An OPE is indistinguishable under ordered chosen-
plaintext attack (IND-OCPA) [21] if it has no leakage, except
the order of ciphertexts (e.g. [39], [40]).
Fact 2. YM .ECElG is secure by Definition 2 if ECElG cryp-
tosystem [28], whose security relies on the ECDLP (Defini-
tion 5), is secure.
Fact 3. TGECDH is secure with key independence by Defi-
nition 4 if ECDLP is intractable by Definition 5.
Let E and OPE .E be IND-CPA secure [24] and IND-OCPA
secure symmetric ciphers, respectively. ({RSS ji}n,`i=1,j=1, τ)
are RSS values and τ of each SU i and FC for sensing periods
j = 1, . . . , ` in a group G. (L1,L2,L3) are history lists,
which include all values learned by entities SU i, FC and
GW , respectively, during the execution of the protocol for
all sensing periods and membership status of G. Vector ~V is
a list of IND-CPA secure values transmitted over secure
(authenticated) channels. ~V may be publicly observed by all
entities including external attacker A. Hence, ~V is a part of
all lists (L1,L2,L3). Values (jointly) generated by an entity
such as cryptographic keys or variables stored only by the
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sake of brevity. Moreover, information exchanged during the
execution of YM .ECElG protocol are not included in history
lists, since they do not leak any information by Fact 2.
Theorem 1. Under Security Assumptions 1, LP-2PSS leaks
no information on ({RSS ji}n,`i=1,j=1, τ) beyond IND-
CPA secure {~V j}`j=1, IND-OCPA secure order of tuple
({~Zj = OPE .EKj(RSS j1), . . . ,OPE .EKj(RSS jn)}`j=1, τ)
and {bji}n,`i=1,j=1 to FC .
Proof: ~V j = {chnji}n,`i=1,j=1 at Step 6 of Algorithm 1. History
lists are as follows for each sensing period j = 1, . . . , `:
L1 = ~V j , L2 = ({bji}ni=1, ~V j , ~Zj),
where {bji}ni=1 are the outcomes of YM .ECElG proto-
col (Steps 11, 17 & 26 of Algorithm 1). By Fact 2,
YM .ECElG protocol leaks no information beyond {bji}ni=1 to
FC and no information to anyone else. Variables in (L1,L2)
are IND-CPA and IND-OCPA secure, and therefore leak no
information beyond the order of tuples in ~Zj to FC by Fact 1.
Any membership status update on G requires an execution
of TGECDH protocol, which generates a new group key
K¯j . By Fact 3, TGECDH guarantees key independence
property (Definition 4), and therefore K¯j is only available to
new members and is independent from previous keys. Hence,
history lists (L1,L2) are computed identically as described
above for the new membership status of G but with K¯j , which
are IND-CPA secure and IND-OCPA secure.
Using a digital signature gives SU s the possibility to learn
the intentions of FC and detect whether it is trying to locate
them. Since no SU wants its location to be revealed, SU s will
simply refuse to participate in the sensing upon detection of
malicious activity of FC by verifying the signed messages.
The only way that FC can learn the location of a SU in this
case is when this SU continues to participate in the sensing
even after detecting the malicious intents of FC . 
Theorem 2. Under Security Assumptions 1, LP-3PSS leaks
no information on ({RSS ji}n,`i=1,j=1, τ) beyond IND-
CPA secure {~V j}`j=1, IND-OCPA secure pairwise order
{OPE .EkFC ,i(RSS ji ), OPE .EkFC ,i(τ)}n,`i=1,j=1 to GW and
{bji}n,`i=1,j=1 to FC .
Proof: ~V j = {θji , ςji , ζj}n,`i=1,j=1, where {θji}n,`i=1,j=1 and
{ςji , ζj}n,`i=1,j=1 are generated at the initialization and private
sensing in Algorithm 2, respectively. History lists are as
follows for each sensing period j = 1, . . . , `:
L1 = ~V j , L2 = ({bji}n,`i=1,j=1, ~V j),
L3 = ({OPE .EkFC ,i(RSS ji ),OPE .EkFC ,i(τ)}n,`i=1,j=1, ~V j ,
{bji}n,`i=1,j=1)
Variables in (L1,L2,L3) are IND-CPA secure and IND-OCPA
secure, and therefore leak no information beyond the pairwise
order of ciphertexts to GW by Fact 1.
Any membership status update on G requires an authenti-
cated channel establishment or removal for joining or leaving
members, whose private keys are independent from each other.
Hence, history lists (L1,L2,L3) are computed identically as
described above for the new membership status of G, which
are IND-CPA secure and IND-OCPA secure. 
Corollary 1. Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 guarantee that in
our schemes, RSS values and τ are IND-OCPA secure for all
sensing periods and membership changes. Hence, our schemes
achieve Objectives 1.
A. Discussion about SCPU-based LP-3PSS’s security
The security of SCPU-based LP-3PSS could be reduced to
that of the SCPU that is used. Since no direct communication
exists between FC and SU s, the only way for FC to learn
RSS values of SU s is by compromising the SCPU. Having
the secret keys that were used to OPE encrypt SU s’ RSS val-
ues, a successful attempt to break into this secure hardware
by FC will allow it to decrypt the RSS values and learn
SU s’ locations. However, as mentioned earlier, a SCPU that
complies with the physical security requirements of FIPS 140-
2 level 4 [37] should guarantee that such a breach does not
happen. And thus, FC should not be able to retrieve the data
in the SCPU even though the latter is deployed inside the
malicious FC itself.
B. Discussion about collusion between different entities
We also investigate how our schemes perform under col-
lusion. We discuss different collusion scenarios for each pro-
posed scheme separately.
For LP-2PSS, if multiple SU s collude to learn another SU ’s
location information, their collusion can only allow them to
learn IND-CPA secure values ~V which contain the OPE en-
crypted RSS s transmitted over the authenticated secure chan-
nel between the target SU and FC . This means that collusion
among SU s does not allow them to learn RSS measurements
of other SU s and, thus, nor their location. The second scenario
is when FC colludes with some SU s to localize other SU s.
In this case, FC will have access to the group key K used by
SU s to encrypt their RSS measurements. Only in this case
would FC be able to learn SU s’ locations. Therefore, LP-
2PSS is robust against collusion among compromised SU s,
but assumes that FC cannot collude with SU s.
Similar reasoning applies to LP-3PSS. Collusion among
SU s does not allow them to infer other SU s’ locations. And
if SU s collude with GW , they can only manage to learn the
OPE encrypted RSS measurements of the SU s but nothing
more, as each SU OPE encrypts its RSS measurement with
its own secret key. Also, collusion between FC and some
SU s cannot reveal the RSS measurements of other SU s
as the latter send their OPE encrypted RSS s through their
authenticated channels established individually with the GW .
This prevents colluding SU s and FC from accessing the
private information of other SU s and subsequently localizing
them. Thus, for LP-3PSS, only collusion between GW and
FC could reveal RSS measurements of all SU s as FC has
the secret keys that were used by SU s to OPE encrypt
their RSS values before sending them to GW . However, this
specific collusion scenario could be dealt with, for example,
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TABLE II: Computational overhead comparison
Scheme
Computation
FC SU GW
LP-2PSS γ/2 · (2 + log n) · (PMulQ+ PAddQ+√δ · Pol) (4γ − 6) · PAddQ+OPE + µ · (2 log n + 2) · PMulQ -
LPOS 1/2 · (2 + log n) · γ · |p| ·Mulp (2γ · |p|+ 2γ) ·Mulp+OPE + 2µ · log n · PMulQ -
ECEG PMulQ+ PAddQ+
√
n · δ · Pol 2PMulQ+ PAddQ (n − 2) · PAddQ -
PPSS H + (n + 2) ·Mulp+ (2γ−1 · n + 2) · Expp H + 2Expp+Mulp -
LP-3PSS D + β(t) · (E +OPEE) OPEE + E n · D + E
PDAFT 2ExpN 2 + InvN 2 + y ·MulN 2 2ExpN 2 +MulN 2 n ·MulN 2
(i) Variables: κ security parameter, N : modulus in Paillier, p: modulus of El Gamal, H: cryptographic hash operation, K: secret group key of OPE . Expu and Mulu denote
a modular exponentiation and a modular multiplication over modulus u respectively, where u ∈ {N ,N 2, p}. InvN 2: modular inversion over N 2, PMulQ: point
multiplication of order Q, PAddQ: point addition of order Q. y : number of servers needed for decryption in PDAFT . (ii) Parameters size: For a security parameter κ = 80,
suggested parameter sizes by NIST 2012 are given by : |N | = 1024, |p| = 1024, |Q| = 192 as indicated in [41]. (iii) YM.ECElGamal: The communication cost for one
comparison is 4γ · |Q|. The total computational cost of the scheme for one comparison is γ · (PMulQ+ 5PAddQ+√δ · Pol)− 6PAddQ. (iv) ECEG: The decryption
of the aggregated message in ECEG is done by solving the constrained ECDLP problem on small plaintext space similarly to [5] via Pollard’s Lambda algorithm, which requires
O(
√
n · δ) ·Pol computation and O(log(nδ)) storage [42], where δ = a− b if RSS ∈ [a, b] and Pol is the number of point operations in Pollard Lambda algorithm which
varies depending on algorithm implementation used. For SU ’s overhead, the left column shows the cost for a normal SU in ECEG and the right column shows the cost of the
SU that plays the role of a gateway in ECEG . (v) TGECDH: It permits the alteration of group membership (i.e., join/leave), on average O(log(n)) communication and
computation (i.e., ECC scalar multiplication) [43]. (vi) OPE: we rely on OPE scheme proposed by Boldyreva [21] for our evaluation because of its popularity and public
implementation but our schemes can use any secure OPE scheme (e.g., [21], [39], [40]) as a building block. (vi) E : We rely on AES [44]2 as our (E ,D) for our cost analysis.
by deploying a secure hardware within FC to play the role
of GW . The inherent nature of such a hardware prevents
FC from accessing it and colluding with it. We provided an
explanation to this in Section V. This proofs that LP-3PSS is
not only robust against collusion among SU s themselves, but
also against collusion between FC and compromised SU s.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
We now evaluate our proposed schemes, LP-2PSS and LP-
3PSS, by comparing LP-2PSS to its predecessor LPOS [17],
ECEG and PPSS as these schemes are all designed for
the sensing architecture without a gateway, and comparing
LP-3PSS to PDAFT as both are designed for the sensing
architecture with a gateway.
A. Existing Approaches: PPSS , ECEG , and PDAFT
PPSS [5] uses secret sharing and the Privacy Preserving
Aggregation (PPA) process proposed in [45] to hide the
content of specific sensing reports and uses dummy report
injections to cope with the DLP attack.
In ECEG , SU s encrypt their RSS s with FC ’s ECElG pub-
lic key. One of the nodes aggregates these ciphertexts including
its own and then sends the aggregated result to FC . The
FC then decrypts the aggregated result with its ECElG private
key and makes the final decision.
PDAFT [16] combines Paillier cryptosystem [46] with
Shamir’s secret sharing [47], where a set of smart meters
sense the consumption of different households, encrypt their
reports using Paillier, then send them to a gateway. The
gateway multiplies these reports and forwards the result to the
control center, which selects a number of servers (among all
servers) to cooperate in order to decrypt the aggregated result.
PDAFT requires a dedicated gateway, just like LP-3PSS, to
collect the encrypted data, and a minimum number of working
servers in the control center to decrypt the aggregated result.
B. Performance Analysis and Comparison
We focus on communication and computational overheads.
We consider the overhead incurred during the sensing oper-
ations but not that related to system initialization (e.g. key
establishment), where most of the computation and commu-
nication is done offline. We model the membership change
events in the network as a random process R that takes on 0
and 1, and whose average is µ. R = 0 means that no change
occurred in the network and R = 1 means that some SU s
left/joined the sensing task. Let β(t) be a function that models
the average number of SU s that join the sensing at the current
sensing period t.
We precise that our performance analysis is not based
on a simulation but rather on measuring the computational
and communication overhead involved in the cryptographic
operations that we deployed, like YM .ECElG protocol and
OPE . This gives us an idea about how our schemes per-
form compared to existent approaches in terms of incurred
overhead. The execution times of the different primitives and
protocols were measured on a laptop running Ubuntu 14.10
with 8GB of RAM and a core M 1.3 GHz Intel processor,
with cryptographic libraries MIRACL [48], Crypto++ [49] and
Louismullie’s Ruby implementation of OPE [50]. C++ imple-
mentations that we developed for the optimized ECElG and
the YM .ECElG schemes will be provided for public use.
Computational Overhead: Table II provides an analytical
computational overhead comparison including the details of
variables, parameters and the overhead of building blocks.
In LP-2PSS, FC requires only a logarithmic number of
YM .ECElG executions. An SU requires a small constant
number of Point additions PAddQ, one OPE encryption
and group key update, which is necessary only µ percent
of the time when there is a change in the network (with
only a logarithmic overhead in the number of SU s). The
signature verification operation, that new SU s have to perform
upon joining the sensing, is extremely fast in most of the
digital signature schemes compared to the system overall
computational overhead that we study in this section. This
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makes the delay introduced by the digital signature negligible
compared to the overall computational overhead inferred by
LP-2PSS regardless of the used digital signature scheme. Thus,
we don’t consider this delay in our evaluation. This makes LP-
2PSS much more efficient than ECEG and PPSS , especially
for a relatively large number of SU s.
In LP-3PSS, FC requires only a small constant number
of (D, E ,OPE ) operations. An SU requires one OPE and
E encryptions of its RSS . Finally, GW requires one D oper-
ation per SU and one E of vector b . All computations in LP-
3PSS rely on only symmetric cryptography, which makes it the
most computationally efficient scheme among all alternatives
as discussed below.
For illustration purpose, we plot in Figure 4 the system
end-to-end computational overhead of the different schemes.
Figure 4(a) shows that LP-2PSS incurs an overhead that is
comparable to that incurred by ECEG , but much lower than
that incurred by PPSS . Figure 4(a) shows also that LP-
2PSS performs slightly better than its predecessor LPOS .
Figure 4(b) shows that LP-3PSS is several order of magni-
tudes faster than PDAFT for any number of SU s.
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Fig. 4: Computation Overhead, β = 5, µ = 20% & κ = 80
Notice that the key generation and signing operations are
done only once at the beginning of the protocol as τ , and
thus T , should be static over time unless a dramatic change
in the system environment occurs which leads to the re-
execution of the LP-2PSS’s initialization phase. That is why
these operations are not counted for the operational overhead
of our scheme.
We also study the impact of the security parameter, κ, which
controls the encryption key length, by varying it in accordance
with NIST’s recommendations [41]. Note that this assesses
the suitability of a scheme for a long term deployment in
a stable networking infrastructure. Figure 5, evaluating the
schemes under three values of κ, shows that our schemes
are the least impacted by increasing security parameters. It
also shows that LP-3PSS is significantly more efficient than
PDAFT in terms of computation overhead for all entities.
Note that our schemes achieve a delay, which is well below the
2-second computation delay required by IEEE 802.22 standard
for TV white space management [26]. This standard requires
that the system handles dynamism in the network and that
RSS values lie within the interval [−104, 23.5]dB and are
encoded under 8 bits. Figures 5(a) & 5(c) show the gain in
computational performance of LP-2PSS over LPOS especially
for high security levels and from the SU s side.
Communication Overhead: Table III provides the analyti-
cal communication overhead comparison. LP-2PSS requires
log(n) message exchanges for YM protocol, n OPE cipher-
texts and log(n) messages for group key update (only needed
µ percent of the time when there is a membership change). If
some SU s join the CRN , LP-2PSS requires sharing the digital
signature σ of message T and the public key PKDS used to
construct this signature with β new SU s. LP-3PSS requires
(n+1) E ciphertexts and single ζ, which are significantly
smaller than the values transmitted by PDAFT .
We further compare our schemes with their counterparts in
terms of communication overhead in Figure 6. Figure 6(a) il-
lustrates the communication overhead induced by LP-2PSS us-
ing different digital signature schemes (HORS , ECDSA and
NTRU) compared to the original scheme, LPOS , and also
to existent approaches PPSS and ECEG . This Figure shows
that LP-2PSS is more efficient than PPSS and ECEG due to
the use of elliptic curve cryptography with smaller key sizes.
Using ECDSA or NTRU seems to be the best option in terms
of communication overhead as expected. For a large number
of SU s, using a digital signature scheme with large signature
size like HORS does not prevent LP-2PSS-HORS from
performing better than existent approaches especially for a
large number of SU s. Figure 6(b) shows that LP-3PSS has
the smallest communication overhead when compared with
PDAFT , since it relies on symmetric cryptography only.
PPSS and PDAFT have a very high communication over-
head due to the use of expensive public key encryptions (e.g.,
Pailler [46]).
We also study and show in Figure 7 the impact of the
security parameter, κ, on the communication overhead. Note
that the performance gap between our schemes and their
counterparts drastically grows when κ is increased, showing
the suitability of our schemes for long term deployment. Our
schemes possess this desirable feature, thanks to their inno-
vative use of compact cryptographic primitives. Figures 6(a)
& 7(a) show again how efficient LP-2PSS is compared to the
original LPOS in terms of communication overhead.
Overall, our performance analysis indicates that LP-3PSS is
more efficient than LP-2PSS, and significantly more efficient
than all other counterpart schemes in terms of computation
and communication overhead, even for increased values of
the security parameters, but with the cost of including an
additional entity. Moreover, Figures 5 & 7 show that our
schemes are impacted much less by increased security parame-
ters when compared to existing alternatives, and therefore are
ideal for long term deployment. Note that our performance
analysis lacks the evaluation of the SCPU-based version of
LP-3PSS due to the fact that this hardware is very expensive.
VIII. CONCLUSION
We developed two efficient schemes for cooperative spec-
trum sensing that protect the location privacy of SU s with
a low cryptographic overhead while guaranteeing an efficient
spectrum sensing. Our schemes are secure and robust against
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Fig. 5: Computational Overhead Variation with Respect to Security Parameter κ for n = 1200, β = 5 & µ = 20%
TABLE III: Communication overhead comparison
Scheme Communication
LP-2PSS 2γ · |Q| · (2 + log n) + n · OPE + µ · |Q| · log n + β · (|σ|+ |PKDS |)DS
LPOS 2γ · |p| · (2 + log n) + n · OPE + µ · |Q| · log n
ECEG 4|Q| · (4n + β)
PPSS |p| · n + β · µ · |p| · n
LP-3PSS (n + 1) · E
PDAFT |N | · (2(n + 1) + β)
OPE = 128 bits: maximum ciphertext size obtained under OPE encryption, E : size of ciphertext under E . |σ| and |PKDS | are respectively the size of the digital signature
and the public key of the digital signature scheme DS.
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Fig. 6: Communication Overhead, β = 5, µ = 20% & κ = 80
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Fig. 7: Communication Overhead with varying κ = (80, 112,
128) for n = 1200, β = 5 & µ = 20%.
SU s’ dynamism, failures, and maliciousness. Our performance
analysis indicates that our schemes outperform existing alter-
natives in various metrics.
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